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In November, 1994, the U.S. Congress passed the International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA or the Act),' provid-
ing U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies with the tools to pursue recip-
rocal arrangements with foreign antitrust enforcement agencies for
the purposes of exchanging confidential and other categories of infor-
mation and retrieving new evidence located abroad in aid of these
agencies' respective enforcement activities.
The reciprocal arrangements envisaged by the IAEAA suggest a
readiness on the part of the United States to negotiate "second gener-
ation" cooperation agreements with foreign agencies, supplementing
first generation arrangements such as the United States-European
Union Agreement (U.S.-E.U. Agreement) concluded in 1991.2 These
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1 International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. § 6201 et seq.
(Supp. 1996). [hereinafter the IAEAA or the Act].
2 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commis-
sion of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, 4
Trade Reg. Rpt. (CCH) 9 13,504 (September 23, 1991). The French Government successfully
Trading Secrets
16:478 (1996)
first generation agreements are essentially limited by their failure to
provide for confidential information exchange, considered vital to the
ultimate success of international antitrust enforcement. Given the lib-
eralization of world trade, achieved through vehicles such as the VTO
and resulting in the significant globalization of the economic activity
of firms, sharing information located abroad has become central to the
ability of antitrust authorities effectively to police anti-competitive ac-
tion extending across national boundaries.'
In the face of these concerns, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are anxious to create a
broad network of agreements under the IAEAA with compatible
countries. In particular, they hope to enter an agreement with the
European Union (E.U.) and some E.U. Member States, recognizing
their dual competence in competition matters.4 To this end, U.S. offi-
cials have visited their counterparts in various Member States, includ-
ing Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom to promote the Act.5
This article will explore the terms of the IAEAA, questioning in
particular whether the Act provides a viable mechanism for informa-
tion exchange, as well as whether it embodies a true commitment to
argued to the European Court of Justice that the Agreement should have been concluded by the
European Council rather than the European Commission. French Republic v. Commission of
the European Communities, Case C-327/91 (1994). As an internal European matter, therefore,
the Agreement was not operative until the European Council formally endorsed it in April,
1995. 1995 O.J. L 95/47; 1995 OJ. L 134/25. As a matter of international law, however, the
European Union was still bound by the Agreement, and thus in the interim, both U.S. and E.U.
competition authorities largely upheld their obligations under the terms of the Agreement.
3 See generally Competition Policy in the New Trade Order: Strengthening International Co-
operation and Rules, Report of the Van Miert Group, July, 1995 (on file with the authors).
4 See House Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, Questions for Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust Anne K. Bingaman Concerning H.R. 4781, the International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 (September 12, 1994), answer to question 3
[hereinafter House Questions to Bingaman].
Both the House and Senate Reports accompanying the IAEAA strongly allude to the po-
tential for agreement with the European Union. See H.R. REP. No. 103-772, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess., at 14, 26 (October 3. 1994). [hereinafter "House Report"] (Committee expresses opinion
that despite some flux in the "sovereignty arrangements" between the E.U. and the Member
States, the E.U. has sovereign authority to administer and enforce its antitrust law and to pro-
hibit and regulate disclosure of information that is obtained in the course of an antitrust investi-
gation, as required by IAEAA § 12(9)); S. REP. No. 103-388, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 15
(September 30, 1994). [hereinafter "Senate Report"] (Committee expressly states that the E.U.
is an example of a "regional economic integration organization" within the definition of IAEAA
§ 12(9), and that the E.U. Merger Regulation is an example of a "foreign antitrust law" within
the meaning of IAEAA § 12(7)).
5 Some potential foreign counterparts reportedly appear cool to the idea of entering a bilat-
eral confidential information exchange agreement because they are concerned that the United
States has adopted a policy of using antitrust laws to promote its trade policies.
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international cooperation. Given specific congressional and adminis-
trative interest in reaching agreement with the E.U. and its competi-
tion authority, the European Commission, issues relevant to such an
agreement will be emphasized.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE Acr
The IAEAA authorizes the DOJ and the FTC to negotiate bilat-
eral "mutual assistance agreements" with foreign antitrust authorities,
under which the agencies would make requests of foreign authorities
for evidence located abroad, as well as consider requests from foreign
authorities for evidence located in the United States.
The Act requires that mutual assistance agreements include:6 as-
surances of reciprocal assistance; assurances of confidentiality not less
than that provided by U.S. law; conditions limiting use of evidence
received to the sole purpose of administering/enforcing the antitrust
laws; pledges to return evidence received; and, terms providing for
termination if confidentiality is breached and subsequently not cured.
Requests for information submitted by foreign authorities under
a mutual assistance agreement must again be scrutinized on a case-by-
case basis to determine whether the assurances included in the agree-
ment continue to be operative. Additionally, the DOJ/FTC must find
that honoring the foreign request is consistent with the U.S. public
interest.7
If a foreign request for assistance is granted, the Act empowers
the DOJ/FTC to offer two types of assistance to foreign governments:
(1) disclosure of antitrust information from within their files;8 and (2)
use of their investigative authority to obtain new evidence from pri-
vate parties.9 For the latter type of assistance, the Act empowers the
agencies to utilize two mechanisms in order to satisfy foreign requests.
First, they may use their normal investigative powers (e.g., CIDs, sub-
poenas) on behalf of the foreign partner requesting such assistance.10
Second, they may apply to a U.S. federal court for an order requiring
a party to give testimony or produce documents or other things in
response to a foreign request for assistance." The DOJ/FTC would
6 IAEAA § 12(2).
7 IAEAA § 8(a)(3).
8 IAEAA § 2.
9 IAEAA § 3(b).
10 IAEAA § 3.
11 IAEAA § 4. Section 4(b)(2)(B) provides that the order may specify that the practice and
procedure of the foreign partner be used to obtain the information. This section is premised




offer either category of assistance only if it were offered that category
of assistance by the other party to the agreement.
From the perspective of the DOJ/FTC, the benefits of offering
assistance in return for reciprocal assistance are twofold: (1) in cases
where the United States does not otherwise have jurisdiction, foreign
assistance would provide the possibility to get information; and (2) in
cases where the United States believes it has jurisdiction, but would
have to exercise it extraterritorially, foreign assistance would avoid
engendering opposition from foreign governments.
IM. DISCUSSION
Two major issues require scrutiny by a foreign antitrust authority
contemplating entry into an agreement pursuant to the IAEAA:
whether the United States can offer acceptable levels of confidential-




From the perspective of the U.S. enforcement agencies, the driv-
ing force behind the IAEAA is to obtain evidence located abroad for
direct use in U.S. court proceedings. This stems from the litigation-
based nature of U.S. antitrust enforcement. Thus, the Act contains
provisions to ensure that information can be obtained from foreign
partners in a form which would make it admissible in evidence in a
U.S. court.
This is especially relevant when considering assurances of confi-
dentiality made by the U.S. agencies with regard to a mutual assist-
ance agreement entered pursuant to the Act. The Act prohibits the
DOJ/FTC from disclosing in violation of an antitrust mutual assist-
ance agreement any evidence received under the auspices of an agree-
ment.'2 Thus, such evidence is exempt from the disclosure
requirements of other U.S. laws such as the Freedom of Information
provide assistance to foreign courts or foreign tribunals. The purpose of IAEAA § 4(b)(2)(B) is
to allow flexibility to get information through procedures that would, to the extent consistent
with U.S. law, be compatible with the evidentiary and other requirements of the foreign partner
seeking the information. It is not clear what standard a court would use in deciding whether to
grant a request for such an order. Presumably, a court could rely on precedent stemming from
the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, as well as the legislative history of the IAEAA, to make that
determination.
12 IAEAA § 8(b). For comment, see House Report, supra note 4, at 21; Senate Report,
supra note 4, at 13.
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Act (FOIA).' 3 However, the IAEAA does not relieve the DOJ/FTC
of other obligations to reveal information. Moreover, it leaves open
some avenues for discretionary release of information to other parties,
including state attorneys general.
The following represent limitations on any confidentiality guaran-
tee which can be offered in an agreement under the Act:
a. Disclosure to a Defendant/Respondent once a complaint has
been filed
Broad U.S. rules regarding disclosure and discovery in the course
of a trial might jeopardize the confidentiality of any information com-
municated to the DOJ/FTC by a foreign partner. Although not spe-
cifically mentioned in the IAEAA, these derogations are subsumed in
the Act's confidentiality guarantee, which states that while the DOJ/
FTC may not disclose in violation of a mutual assistance agreement
any antitrust evidence received from a foreign partner, the scope of
the confidentiality guarantee "may not prevent the disclosure of such
antitrust evidence to a defendant in an action or proceeding brought
by the Attorney General or the Commission for a violation of any of
the Federal laws if such disclosure would otherwise be required by
Federal law."' 4
i. Criminal cases - Brady and the Federal Rules exceptions
Once a complaint is filed, the prosecution is under an obligation
to disclose certain information to the defendant. Although the
Supreme Court has expressly held that the prosecution need not pro-
vide the defendant in a criminal action with the entire file,15 the
Brady'6 doctrine, on the basis of constitutional due process, prohibits
suppression by the prosecution of material,' 7 exculpatory evidence
sought by a defendant prior to trial. Although no general constitu-
tional obligation requires the prosecutor to disclose inculpatory evi-
dence to a defendant prior to trial, Federal Rule of Criminal
Note that prior to the IAEAA, the FTC would not have been able to grant such confidenti-
ality. A foreign partner would presumably not have benefited from the broad confidentiality
provision included in 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(f), as that section is limited to information received by
the FTC either pursuant to compulsory process or voluntarily in lieu of such compulsory process.
13 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
1 IAEAA § 8(b).
15 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
16 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1968).
17 E.g., evidence that "might have affected the outcome of the trial." United States v. Agurs,




Procedure 16(a)(1)(C) mandates government disclosure of documents
either intended for use by the prosecution at trial, or otherwise mate-
rial to the defense.'8
Thus, once a complaint is filed, the aforementioned exceptions
could require disclosure to a defendant of a substantial amount of
both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence contained within DOJ/
FTC files, regardless of whether the agency intends to introduce the
material into evidence at trial. Information disclosed could of course
include that received from a foreign authority. Moreover, information
admitted in evidence will essentially be disclosed to the public as part
of the court record. It is possible to seek a protective order from the
court limiting disclosure both during discovery and during court pro-
ceedings, but whether to grant such an order, as well as the terms of
the order, are within the discretion of the court. Where constitutional
principles are involved, reliance on the issuance of protective orders is
arguably tenuous.
ii. Civil cases
The proviso in IAEAA section 8(b) that information be revealed
to defendants in the course of court proceedings also applies to civil
actions. Although not a matter of constitutional law, respondents in
contested civil antitrust actions are also given broad access to DOJ
files. As a general matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)
states that parties "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action."'19 This broad rule may be used by a respondent to
demand information from the government fie, regardless of whether
the information is to be introduced by the government at trial, or even
if it ultimately might be inadmissible at trial, provided only that it is
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence."2 0 Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not
binding on the FTC in its administrative proceedings, the agency's dis-
18 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C). An exception to this discovery rule is provided for "reports,
memoranda, or other internal government documents made by the attorney for the government
or other government agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case."
FED. R. CRiM. P. 16(a)(2). However, it is not clear whether this exception merely restates the
traditional protection offered by the work product doctrine.
19 Note that the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have broadened
Rule 26, requiring parties to exchange certain information prior to discovery, even absent a re-
quest from opposing counsel. This mandatory exchange includes copies or descriptions of any
documents relating to "disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."
20 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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covery rules closely parallel those of the Federal Rules and are, as a
result, virtually as broad.21
Supplementing discovery are routine pre-trial orders, generally
mandating that parties provide one another with lists documenting all
evidence to be introduced at trial, even if that evidence is legitimately
withheld from discovery under one of the discovery limits discussed
below.22 Respondents will thus at least know that the evidence exists,
which could suggest the content or the source of the information.
Certain limits on these broad discovery rights nonetheless exist.
Most relevant with respect to information provided by foreign part-
ners under the terms of a mutual assistance agreement is the limited
access granted to respondents with regard to information submitted to
the DOJ/FTC by third parties. Protective orders are routinely granted
in civil matters, often providing that: (1) access will be limited to
outside counsel, prohibiting respondents themselves from viewing the
documents; (2) prior to use at trial, the third party originally submit-
ting the material will be given notice and an opportunity to seek in
camera status for the materials upon a showing of a clearly defined,
serious injury to the party if public disclosure were granted.23
b. Disclosure between enforcement agencies and the "significant
law enforcement objective" exception
The U.S. agencies sought to ensure that a foreign antitrust en-
forcement authority receiving information from the United States
pursuant to a mutual assistance agreement would not be able to re-
lease it to other foreign government agencies. Thus, the Act limits the
use of information provided by the U.S. agencies to enforcement of a
foreign antitrust law.24 Qualifying this limitation on the use of infor-
mation, section 12(2)(E)(ii) of the Act states that any disclosure of
information provided to a foreign counterpart be limited to terms and
conditions specified in the agreement. These terms and conditions
21 See 16 C.FR. § 4.10(g).
22 Joseph F. Winterscheid, Confidentiality and Rights of Access to Documents Submitted to
the United States Antitrust Agencies, in Procedure and Enforcement in E.C. and U.S. Competi-
tion Law, Proceedings of the Leiden Europa Instituut Seminar on User-Friendly Competition
Law, eds. P.J. Slot & A. McDonnell (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), at 185.
23 See Winterscheid, supra note 22, at 184. Note that aside from protective orders, third
parties submitting materials to the FTC are granted the aforementioned protection at 16 C.F.R.
§ 4.10(g)(exempting from disclosure, absent notice and an opportunity to seek a protective or in
camera order, material obtained through compulsory process or voluntarily in lieu thereof, mate-
rial deemed confidential and protected under 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(f), or material that is confiden-
tial commercial or financial information protected by 15 U.S.C. § 46(0).
24 See IAEAA §§ 2-4.
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could in fact allow for disclosure "essential to a significant law en-
forcement objective, in accordance with the prior written consent" of
the U.S. agencies.'
As a matter of reciprocity, a similar limitation would apply with
respect to the U.S. agencies' use of information they receive from a
foreign partner. Thus, it appears that an agreement could provide for
disclosure to other divisions of the DOJ and FTC, as well as to other
government agencies performing duties "essential to a significant law
enforcement objective, in accordance with the prior written con-
sent. 26 However, unlike the exception in IAEAA section 8(b) re-
garding disclosure to defendants, the section 12(2)(E)(ii) provision is
within the discretion of the parties, and may, but need not, be in-
cluded in negotiation of the mutual assistance agreement.
It is not entirely clear whether the Act's confidentiality guarantee
included in section 8(b), or whether the conscious exclusion of a sec-
tion 12(2)(E)(ii) "significant law enforcement objective," condition
from a mutual assistance agreement, would override other provisions
of U.S. law granting other law enforcement agencies such as state at-
torneys general access - at the discretion of the DOJ/FTC - to
otherwise confidential information included in the DOJ/FTC files.27
In any event, access would be limited to official law enforcement
purposes,' and parties initially submitting the information to the
DOJ/FTC file would normally receive notice of and an opportunity to
object to this access. 29 Moreover, to the extent that these existing pro-
visions state that other law enforcement agencies may merely request
information from the federal antitrust authorities,30 discretionary au-
25 IAEAA § 12(2)(E)(ii).
26 Id.
27 Regarding disclosure to other Federal agencies or State Attorneys General, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 46(f)(permitting disclosure of privileged and confidential trade secrets or commercial or finan-
cial information); 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(c) (2) (permitting disclosure of information considered confi-
dential by the submitter but later determined by the FTC not to be privileged, confidential trade
secrets or commercial or financial information); 16 C.F.R. § 4.10(f)(permitting disclosure of non-
public material obtained by the FTC, without the consent of the submitter if the material is not
confidential, but with notice to the submitter if the material is confidential, Le., trade secrets and
commercial or financial information); 16 C.F.R. § 4.11(c)(permitting disclosure in the context of
mainly state requests arising from a law enforcement purpose).
28 A limited exception to this principle, permits disclosure to states outside of a law enforce-
mentpurpose, L.a, for purposes of drafting legislation. 16 C.F.R. § 4.11(d). Disclosure, however,
while including material that would not be released to the general public, is more limited than
that allowed under Rule 4.11(c).
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 57b-2(c)(2), (3).
30 Id.
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thority might allow the DOJ/FTC to refuse requests to reveal infor-
mation provided by a foreign partner.
Administrative discretion, however, can not trump Congressional
mandates. The IAEAA does not, for example, amend existing disclo-
sure provisions to specifically exempt from disclosure to other law en-
forcement agencies information received from foreign partners.
Without specific Congressional authorization in the form of such
amendments, it is not certain as a matter of administrative law
whether the DOJ/FTC could automatically and categorically deny re-
quests from other law enforcement agencies for information provided
by a foreign partner.
The only instances of judicial inquiry into this issue involve chal-
lenges to the FTC's affirmative decisions to release information to
state attorneys general under 15 U.S.C. § 46(f), rather than challenges
to FTC denials of information requests. While affirming the substan-
tial discretion accorded the FTC on this issue, courts in these cases
have nonetheless felt compelled to lend support to affirmative FTC
decisions to release information by citing to Congressional mandates
expressed in 15 U.S.C. § 46(f), amended by the Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvements Act of 1980, 1 (the Improvements Act) for the
express purpose of "expedit[ing] the flow of information from federal
to state law enforcement officials, in part by eliminating the judicial
obstacles which had previously impeded the flow."'32 These same
courts drew particular attention to the words of those members of
Congress who supported passage of the Improvements Act:
-.. [W]e intended to confirm the Commission's policy ofproviding
documents and information on a nonpublic basis to federal law en-
forcement agencies and to State attorneys general for State law enforce-
ment purposes. This sharing of information is in the best spirit of
Federal-State cooperation. It enhances the States' ability to remedy, in a
manner chosen by the State, economic activities that have adversely af-
fected their citizens. It saves taxpayers' money by minimizing duplica-
tion of efforts and by reducing the time and effort necessary to conduct
State investigations.33
Moreover, even though the Second and Fifth Circuits sided with
the FTC in the two cases involving a challenge by state attorneys gen-
31 Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980).
32 Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. v. FTC, 651 F.2d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 1981).
33 Fleming v. FTC, 670 F.2d 311, 316 n. 14 (1982), quoting statement of Rep. Preyer, 126
Cong. Rec. H3870 (daily ed. May 20, 1980); Jaymar-Ruby, 651 F.2d at 511 (same).
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eral to the FTC's denial of an information request, they did so only
because the information sought had been filed with the commission
pursuant to the premerger notification requirements of Title II of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 34 now codi-
fied as section 7A of the Clayton Act. The courts held that section 7A
"[does] not contemplate the use of premerger information by state
officials. ' 35 In contrast to 15. U.S.C. § 46(f), which "shows that Con-
gress knows how to require that information be made available to
state officials on a confidential basis,"36 the Second Circuit noted that
section 7A "plays an important role in a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that offers no place for state law enforcement efforts. 37
Therefore, while the broad discretion accorded the FTC in its af-
firmative decisions to release information to state attorneys general
might translate into latitude to deny information requests, review of
such denials would likely be colored by the clear expression of Con-
gressional intent in favor of Federal-State cooperation that has been
both appealed to by the FTC and embraced by the courts. In other
words, although the FTC "need not automatically accede to each and
every request for access to [its] files,"'38 the agency must still evaluate
each information request on a case-by-case basis. Past judicial review
of FTC discretion suggests that automatic and categoric denials of re-
quests for information provided by a foreign partner could be deemed
arbitrary and capricious.39 Despite the substantial discretion accorded
the FTC under 15 U.S.C. § 46(f), "permissive statutory language only
affects the scope of an agency's discretion; it does not constitute a li-
cense to undertake actions that are 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law."'' 4° Without spe-
cific congressional amendment of 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) which, un-
amended, unequivocally supports and indeed encourages federal-state
cooperation, this standard limits the ability of the FTC to automati-
cally and categorically deny requests from state attorneys general for
34 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
35 Lieberman v. FTC, 771 F.2d 32, 39 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Mattox v. FTC, 752 F.2d 116,
122 (5th Cir. 1985) (Section 7A "does not authorize the FTC to make public any information.")
36 Id. at 38.
37 Id. at 40.
38 Fleming, 670 F.2d at 316 n.15.
39 Id. ("As long as the Commission is not acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner, it
may deem disclosure inappropriate or undesirable in certain cases as to whose nature we need
not speculate. It is, in fact, Commission policy not to share documents with state officials auto-
matically, but rather to evaluate requests on a case-by-case basis").
40 Local 1219, American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Donovan, 683 F.2d 511,516 n. 16 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and citing as support Fleming, 670 F.2d at 316 n. 15.
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information provided by a foreign party, regardless of the specific
terms of a mutual assistance agreement.
Additionally, it appears that 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(f) 41 already con-
tains an exhaustive list of the situations automatically and categori-
cally "immune" from disclosure by the FTC at the behest of requests
from other law enforcement agencies. It is axiomatic that "[w]here
Congress provides express exceptions, courts should not imply
others. ' 42 Within the context of Clayton Act section 7A, for example,
the Second Circuit took Congress' exhaustive authorization of disclo-
sure in connection with ongoing administrative and judicial proceed-
ings and in communications with Congress "as evidence that the
statute's prohibition of disclosure was otherwise meant to be univer-
sal."'" Absent specific congressional amendment, it appears that 15
U.S.C. § 576-2(f) maintains a frozen list of categories granted "immu-
nity" status.
Political considerations also weigh against broad use of DOJ/FTC
discretion to summarily deny requests from other law enforcement
agencies for information supplied by foreign partners. First, by ex-
tending blanket confidentiality protection only to information pro-
vided by foreign partners, the DOJ/FTC would essentially place
foreign partners in a more advantageous position than domestic par-
ties submitting information either subject to process or voluntarily in
lieu thereof. Some members of Congress might have difficulty ac-
cepting this paradox as consistent with U.S. public interest. This is
particularly true given the clear congressional intent in 15 U.S.C.
§ 46(f) to promote and encourage information sharing "in the best
spirit of Federal-State cooperation." 44 Furthermore, in the case of the
FTC, a decision to flex its discretionary muscles and deny information
requests submitted by state law enforcement agencies would consti-
tute a substantial change in agency policy. Even before the FTC re-
ceived express authorization from Congress, with the passage of the
41 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(f) reads as follows: "EXEMPIrON FROM DISCLOSURE. Any material
which is received by the [FTC] in any investigation, a purpose of which is to determine whether
any person may have violated any provision of the laws administered by the [FTC], and which is
provided pursuant to any compulsory process under sections 41 to 46 and 47 to 58 of this title or
which is provided voluntarily in place of such compulsory process shall be exempt from disclo-
sure under section 552 of Title 5."
42 Lieberman, 771 F.2d at 38, citing Andrus v. Glover, 446 U.S. 608,616-17 (1980). For other
endorsements of the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, see also Leatherman v. Tarrant
Cty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, et al., 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978).
43 Mattox, 752 F.2d at 120.




Improvements Act, to share file information with state attorneys gen-
eral, the agency's policy was to cooperate with the states, even in the
face of "onerous litigation attendant to those disclosure efforts. 4 5
Moreover, according to its 1995 Report to Congress, the FTC denied
only two of 300 state requests for agency records made to it between
1989 and 1993.46 Considered together, these factors make a sudden
policy shift unlikely and politically unattractive.
c. Threshold issue: Freedom of Information Act
The IAEAA section 8(b) exempts evidence obtained from for-
eign authorities from the disclosure requirements of the FOIA which,
otherwise, grant any person a general right of access to federal agency
records. The disclosure exemptions written into the FOIA itself ar-
guably already covered at least some DOJ/FTC file information47
prior to passage of the IAEAA, making the confidentiality guarantee
in IAEAA section 8(b) redundant, or at least not as important as it
would be if the FOIA contained no such exemption programs.
2. U.S. Concerns with Foreign Partner's Ability to Guarantee
Confidentiality
The Act contains various precautionary provisions designed to
safeguard the confidentiality of information provided by U.S. agencies
in response to a foreign request. These provisions were included in
response to concerns voiced by the U.S. business community. The
main confidentiality requirement, as set forth in section 12(2), states
that the foreign authority must be subject to confidentiality laws ade-
quate to "maintain securely" confidentiality, the guarantee of which
must in any event not be less than that offered by the United States.
This requires an assessment by U.S. authorities of not only the nomi-
45 Fleming, 670 F.2d at 315.
46 Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission
Act Amendments of 1994, February, 1995, at page 23, n.61. In 1994, the FTC in fact "deferred"
granting portions of several requests until later in a particular investigation. ld.
47 The relevant FOIA exemptions which arguably made DOJ/FTC files exempt from disclo-
sure pre-IAEAA are as follows:
1) Agency personnel rules/practices;
2) Records specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute, Le., section 7A of the
Clayton Act, exempting Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger filings from public disclosure
requirements;
3) Records containing trade secrets or other commercial/financial information received
from a person and which is also privileged and confidential;
4) Agency correspondence;
5) Information that could interfere with proceedings aimed at law enforcement.
See Winterscheid, supra note 22, at 178-79.
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nal provisions of the foreign authority's confidentiality laws, but also
of whether, as a practical matter, those laws will be effectively
implemented.
In making this assessment with regard to the E.U., for example,
U.S. agencies may also be obliged to inquire into the confidentiality
guarantees of the various E.U. Member States. Several parties com-
menting on the IAEAA prior to its passage expressed concern that
evidence provided to the European Commission under a mutual
assistance agreement would automatically be disclosed to all Member
States.4" Although this may reflect a concern for keeping track of any
information provided to the Commission, as well as a concern that
U.S. parties could become subject to antitrust enforcement actions at
both the E.U. and Member State level, it may also reflect a perception
that the Member States, with interests in national industry, are often
effectively competitors of U.S. industry. Although not specifically
mentioning any particular potential foreign partner in this regard, the
House and the Senate both stressed that disclosing evidence to a for-
eign government with a proprietary interest in the outcome of a par-
ticular foreign antitrust investigation presents a serious confidentiality
problem, by providing sensitive commercial information to a party
that is essentially a competitor of the U.S. company concerned.49 In
this case, recall that the Act itself calls for the DOJ/F-C to consider
the presence of foreign government proprietary interests as poten-
tially violative of U.S. public interest. This supports an argument
against granting a particular foreign request for information or
assistance.5 0
48 See Report of the Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of International Law and
Practice of the American Bar Association on the Proposed International Antitrust Enforcement
Assistance Act, August 1, 1994, at 20 and n.24; Statement of the United States Council for Inter-
national Business on the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, August 2,
1994, at 2. Under Article 10(1) of the E.U.'s "Regulation 17" (Council Regulation 17/62, 6
February 1962, reprinted in Official Journal, English Special Edition 1959-1962, p. 87), the Euro-
pean Commission is to provide Member State authorities with applications, notifications, and
copies of "the most important document" contained in the Commission's files. The Commission
has the power to determine which are the most important documents, and has been directed by
the European Court of Justice to consider the general principle of the protection of business
secrets. Case C-36192P Samenwerkende Elektriciteits-produktiebedriven NV (SEP) v. European
Commission [1994] ECR 1-1911, sections 35-37.
49 House Report, supra note 4, at 20; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 13.




Two particular issues raise concerns regarding the United States'
commitment to reciprocal, bilateral cooperation, as opposed to
extraterritoriality.
1. U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations
The first concern involves the issuance in 1995 of revised Anti-
trust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (the
Guidelines), 51 which promote a vigorous approach to the extraterrito-
rial application of the U.S. antitrust laws. Upon invitation, the Euro-
pean Commission submitted comments on the draft Guidelines,
criticizing in particular their failure adequately to recognize the princi-
ples of comity as expressed in the present E.U.-U.S. Agreement.
While the IAEAA advances the principle of reciprocal cooperation, it
is appropriate to question whether administration of the Act will be
colored by the tone of the Guidelines. In other words, it is legitimate
to inquire whether the Guidelines dilute the general tenor of reciproc-
ity and cooperation embodied by the Act, suggesting instead a re-
newed emphasis on the pursuit of extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust law.
2. Provisions of the IAEAA
The second concern involves particular provisions of the Act
which, as supplemented by elaborative comments in the Act's con-
gressional history and by DOJ/FTC officials, warrant further inquiry
into the Act's commitment to reciprocal assistance. Although the
statements of DOJ/FTC officials should be read in light of their need
to "sell" the Act to Congress, they are nonetheless useful to gauge the
degree of reciprocal assistance the U.S. agencies will be both willing
and empowered to offer.
a. Conduct permitted under U.S. law
Although the Act authorizes U.S. antitrust authorities to grant
foreign requests for information or assistance "without regard to
whether the conduct investigated violates any of the [U.S.] antitrust
laws,"52 Assistant Attorney General Bingaman expressed her belief
51 U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations (1995).
52 IAEAA § 3(c).
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that cases of conduct violative of foreign antitrust laws yet permitted
under U.S. law are in fact "rare. '53 Given that, for example, a Euro-
pean Commission investigation warranting a request for information
from U.S. authorities may in fact focus on conduct not covered by
U.S. antitrust prohibitions, Bingaman's statement warrants inquiry
into whether as a matter of policy such information requests would be
honored.
b. "Public Interest" provision
The IAEAA requires that before granting a foreign request for
information or investigative assistance under a mutual assistance
agreement, the U.S. authorities must find that honoring the request is
consistent with U.S. public interest.54 Although such requirements
are standard in legislation of this sort, heavy reliance upon the provi-
sion by the House, the Senate, and Assistant Attorney General Bin-
gaman raises the question of whether the United States is prepared to
provide truly reciprocal assistance, or whether it will frequently deny
foreign requests or only grant them subject to burdensome conditions,
under the auspices of the "public interest."
The House, the Senate, and Bingaman all mention the "public
interest" provision as a rationale to deny a foreign request pursuant to
an investigation of conduct not prohibited by U.S. antitrust law. 5
Further, the House and the Senate in the legislative history of the Act
herald the provision as a source of "wide latitude" for U.S. antitrust
authorities, giving them the power to deny foreign requests or to at-
tach conditions to their being granted based upon a multitude of fac-
tors, including:56 whether the foreign government has any proprietary
interest in the outcome of a particular investigation;57 whether a target
party should be notified of the foreign request and given an opportu-
nity to contest the request; whether a target party has been granted
immunity from U.S. antitrust prosecution in exchange for testimony
on a matter; whether the evidence requested involves particularly sen-
sitive competitive information such as a company's future business or
product plans; and, whether the party subject to a request is not in fact
53 See House Questions to Bingaman, supra note 4, answers to questions 2, 5.
54 IAEAA § 8(a)(3).
55 House Report, supra note 4, at 15; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 11; House Questions to
Bingaman, supra note 4, answer to question 5.
56 House Report, supra note 4, at 20; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 13.
57 See IAEAA § 8(a)(3). This factor, particularly relevant in the context of the discussion of
confidentiality, is the only factor expressly mentioned in the text of the Act.
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the target of an investigation, but rather only happens to possess evi-
dence about an investigative target.
c. "Substantially similar" provision
Within the House Questions to Bingaman, there was some ques-
tion of whether the Act's definition of "foreign antitrust laws" and its
authorization of DOJ/FTC assistance to foreign authorities investigat-
ing violations of those laws in fact limit the scope of the assistance
which could be provided.
"Foreign antitrust laws" are defined in the Act as those laws "that
are substantially similar to any of the [U.S.] antitrust laws and that
prohibit conduct similar to conduct prohibited under the [U.S.] anti-
trust laws." s58 Essentially revisiting the debate over whether assistance
should be granted in cases involving conduct permitted under U.S.
law, the House asked Bingaman whether this definition would prove
to be a restrictive provision, limiting assistance to foreign authorities
to investigations into conduct purportedly violative of only those for-
eign antitrust laws substantively similar to U.S. antitrust law. 59 Bin-
gaman's answer, however, emphasized the utility of the Act's
definition of "foreign antitrust laws" to deny assistance for foreign re-
quests aimed at enforcing foreign laws which, while nominally dubbed
"antitrust," are in fact not truly substantive antitrust laws.60 Further,
the Senate confirmed its general opinion that the Act's definition in-
cluded "foreign regulations having the force of law, such as the Euro-
pean Union's merger regulation."' 61 Therefore, the use of this
provision as a device threatening U.S. reciprocal cooperation under
the IAEAA appears unlikely.
d. Exemptions from DOJ/FTC Ability to Disclose
Several exemptions from the ability to disclose information to
foreign antitrust authorities may hinder the ability of U.S. authorities
to provide truly reciprocal arrangements.
58 IAEAA § 12(7).
59 House Questions to Bingaman, supra note 4, answers to questions 11, 12.
60 House Questions to Bingaman, supra note 4, answers to questions 11, 12.
61 Senate Report, supra note 4, at 15.
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i. Existing provisions of the FTC authorizing legislation
Although section 662 of the IAEAA purports to blanketly over-
ride the disclosure restrictions attendant to the FTC authorizing legis-
lation for foreign partners requesting information under the auspices
of a mutual assistance agreement, the Act does not actually amend
existing law establishing specific confidentiality barriers,63 and does
not add "foreign partners" to the lists of those parties exempt from
the confidentiality barriers.6' Again, "[w]here Congress provides ex-
press exceptions, courts should not imply others."65 While the "gen-
eral override" language of section 6 of the Act is at least preferable to
the approach discussed supra relative to confidentiality,66 it is still pos-
sible that without specific amendments, large amounts of FTC file in-
formation could be excluded from the reach of foreign requests.
ii. Premerger Information
Although section 5(1) of the IAEAA prohibits the disclosure of
premerger information (such as market share breakdowns and future
competitive business strategies) received by the DOJ or FTC under
62 Section 6 of the IAEAA reads as follows: "EXCEPTION TO CERTAIN DISCLOSURE RE-
STRICTIONS. Section 4 of the Antitrust Civil Process Act (15 U.S.C. 1313), and sections 6(f) and
21 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 46, 57b-2), shall not apply to prevent the
Attorney General or the Commission from providing to a foreign antitrust authority antitrust
evidence in accordance with an antitrust mutual assistance agreement in effect under this Act
and in accordance with the other requirements of this Act."
63 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(f)(exempting from disclosure material received by the FTC which is
provided pursuant to compulsory process or voluntarily in place of such compulsory process); 16
C.F.R.§ 4.10(a)(8)(same); 16 C.F.R. § 4.10(d)(exempting from disclosure confidential material
received by the FTC which is provided pursuant to compulsory process or voluntarily in place of
such compulsory process); 16 C.F.R. § 4.10(g)(exempting from disclosure, absent notice and an
opportunity to seek a protective or in camera order, material obtained through compulsory pro-
cess or voluntarily in lieu thereof, material deemed confidential and protected under 15 U.S.C.
§ 57b-2(f), or material that is confidential commercial or financial information protected by 15
U.S.C. § 46(o).
64 Several provisions exempt either other Federal agencies or State Attorneys General from
blanket bars to disclosure. See 15 U.S.C. § 46(f)(permits disclosure of privileged, confidential
trade secrets or commercial or financial information to other Federal agencies or State Attor-
neys General); 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(b)(6) (permits disclosure of information to other Federal agen-
cies or State Attorneys General, given an "official law enforcement purpose"); 16 C.F.R.
§ 4.11(c) (same); 16 C.F.R. § 4.11(d) (permits more limited disclosure of information to other
Federal agencies or State Attorneys General, absent a law enforcement purpose, i.e., drafting
legislation).
65 Lieberman, 771 F.2d at 38, citing Andrus v. Glover, 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980). For other
endorsements of the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, see supra note 42.
66 See text supra at notes 24-45.
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section 7A of the Clayton Act,67 it does not prohibit the DOJ/FrC
from providing assistance in response to foreign requests pertaining to
merger investigations. 68 Inclusion of evidence in a response to a Clay-
ton Act section 7A premerger information request, in other words,
does not automatically immunize the evidence from disclosure to for-
eign antitrust authorities under a mutual assistance agreement. If the
same evidence can be obtained anew through the investigative provi-
sions of the IAEAA,6 9 it may be provided to a foreign authority.
Both the House and the Senate, however, expressed their expec-
tations that the DOJ/FTC would refrain from abusing these investiga-
tive provisions to get around the general prohibition of IAEAA
section 5(1). Rather than broad foreign requests for evidence, the
House and the Senate anticipate "that any requests on behalf of for-
eign antitrust authorities in merger investigations likely would be sig-
nificantly narrower in scope" than those envisaged by the premerger
information requests authorized under section 7A of the Clayton
Act.70 The House went so far as to remind the DOJ/FTC that any
attempts to circumvent IAEAA section 5(1) will be policed by the
U.S. courts.7 '
Although the precise scope of this exception is unclear, it may
have the effect of narrowing the reciprocal provision of information
by the DOJ/FTC.
iii. Grand Jury evidence
The Act maintains the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)
requirement that grand jury information be kept confidential.72 How-
ever, upon a showing to a court of "particularized need" for the grand
jury information, a foreign request under a mutual assistance agree-
ment may be granted.73 It is noteworthy that this showing may be
67 15 U.S.C. § 1Sa, as amended by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, Title II.
68 See IAEAA § 5(1).
69 E.g., court orders compelling production of evidence, subpoenas, civil investigative
demands.
70 Senate Report, supra note 4, at 20. See also House Report, supra note 4, at 16-17.
71 House Report, supra note 4, at 16-17. Note that the availability of judicial review for
violations of Clayton Act Section 7A is unaffected by the IAEAA. IAEAA Section 9(c)(2).
72 IAEAA § 5(2).
73 IAEAA § 5(2)(A). 'The House was particularly concerned to have the U.S. courts decide
whether disclosure of grand jury evidence to a foreign antitrust authority should be granted
when the evidence is in the form of testimony given under a grant of immunity from prosecution
by the U.S. antitrust authorities. See House Report, supra note 4, at 18.
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more burdensome than that required of state attorneys general seek-
ing access to grand jury information.74
IV. CONCLUSION
Closer cooperation between antitrust authorities is necessary to
achieve more effective enforcement as the process of market global-
ization and liberalization continues. The IAEAA represents a clear
invitation to foreign antitrust authorities to negotiate innovative infor-
mation-exchange agreements with the United States and, as such, is a
commendable first step toward realizing improved cooperation. With
a clear understanding of one another's goals, as well as of the mecha-
nisms available for exchanging information, the parties to an IAEAA-
brokered agreement should begin to see substantial improvement in
their abilities to collect confidential information across borders.
At the same time, however, the IAEAA has its limitations. The
U.S. agencies' primary interest in the IAEAA was to obtain a tool for
entering agreements which would help them obtain evidence from for-
eign antitrust authorities for use at trial. The trial disclosure obliga-
tions flowing from the use of this evidence, as well as the Act's failure
to amend several existing provisions of U.S. antitrust law, may limit
the ability of the DOJ/FTC to deliver on promises of confidentiality
and reciprocity. Moreover, the strong interest of the U.S. agencies in
continuing aggressive extraterritorial application of U.S. law, as evi-
denced by the revised Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for Interna-
tional Operations, gives rise to questions regarding DOJ/FTC
motivations in seeking second generation cooperation with their for-
eign counterparts. Understanding and accepting these limitations,
however, does not dilute the significance of the IAEAA and the im-
portant role it has to play in fostering information exchange agree-
ments central to effective world-wide enforcement of antitrust laws.
74 In the legislative history accompanying the IAEAA, the House expressed its view that
"the presence of a 'particularized need' for the evidence cannot be automatically presumed in
the case of a foreign government official as it is in the case of a State official." House Report,
supra note 4, at 17. The 1985 amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(C)(iv)
obviated the need for state officials enforcing a state criminal law to show "particularized need;"
however, such a showing still exists if the evidence is sought for use in a state civil proceeding.
Courts have, of course, had varying interpretations of what must be demonstrated to satisfy the
"particularized need" standard.
